There was a time when the mobilization of experts was a taken-for-prated. unproblematic aspect of decision-making processes. That confidence has vanished. Ascertaining the significance of expertise now requires a reconsideration of the dynamics of controversies. The current view still assimilates conlroversy to the medieval exercise of the disputatio in which two parties argue one against the other. A non-reductionist view is needed to take fully into account the diversity of worlds of relevance involved in the dynamics of any public controversy. Only then is it possible to understand how decision making is predicated upon associations of worlds of relevance, and how expertise is actually a collective learning process which sets the boundary conditions for the efficacy of individual experts.
Introduction
There was a time when the mobilization of experts was a taken-for-granted, unproblematic aspect of decision-making processes. Experts would 'educate the public' and, in so doing, prevent the eruption of controversies. It is upon such a basis that technology assessment, qua expert knowledge, was first established.' Confidence in the power of expertise has now vanished. For more than fifteen years, analysts of public controversies have pointed out that the involvement of scientists in public disputes has promoted the political polarization of controversies? that expert knowledge has been almost routinely deconstructed in the course of litigations,' and that expert interventions have tended to be Seen as ritualistic or manipulative schemes, thus losing much of their credibility. Accusations of having engaged in mercenary practices have also been raised against experts? Many see these trends as threatening the reputation and authority of ~cience.~
However, in what appears as a paradox, the appeal to scientific expertise is growing as never before. As issues which lead to public controversies have nowadays almost invariably a technoscientific dimension, the option of making decisions without resorting to expertise is not much of an option. When such a course of action is actually taken and exposed, it is often branded as irresponsible behaviour. In the context of a controversy, any group which attempts to present its case and to participate in the critical assessment of alternative viewpoints without appealing to any scientific expertise puts itself in a very vulnerable position.
Given the indispensable role of expertise, the issue becomes that of securing its acceptance and efficacy. The problem is usually addressed in one of the following two 0963-6625/93/040417+ 10$07.50 0 1993 LOP Publishing Ltd and The Science Museum ways: either by focusing on the attributes and behaviour of individual experts, or by focusing on the procedures which are expected to provide the best guarantee of objectivity in the selection and use of expertise by governments and their agencies.
Focusing on attributes or on procedures
By focusing on the attributes-such as competence-and behaviour-such as impartiality or honesty-of experts, one certainly captures some of the essential preconditions of a decent expertise, but one also confines oneself, for all practical purposes, to a moral stance. Paying attention to the communication skills of experts may be a more rewarding attitude, since it is generally acknowledged that experts are rarely efficient in this regard. However, empirical observations derived from attendance to public hearings, the analysis of transcripts, interviews with members of groups participating in public controversies and the ongoing evaluation of the consultation process undertaken by a major electric utility on its very controversial development plan, have led us to conclude that this issue may have been overrated. Participants in controversies are not recruited among those deprived of a basic education-quite the contrary. While some of the questions at issue may seem arcane, and the language of professionals and experts difficult and inadequate, participants in a controversy learn more quickly than is generally acknowledged and, provided the process is not too short, soon find the necessary intellectual resources to make sense of the information under discussion. At least, this is what most participants perceive to be the case.' This notwithstanding. the common view of scientists and engineers remains that of filling the 'gap' between lay risk perceptions and expert risk evaluation, thus enforcing the pervasive presupposition that the mastering of scientific information, as provided by scientific experts to the 'public' is the key question during a controversy. Indeed this view has for long been raised to a programmatic status in risk research? This notion is misleading. This is so, because the focus on a supposed information gap is predicated upon a reductionist understanding of what is at stake in controversies.
The traditional communication model in which knowledge is emitted by experts and received by the public, admittedly with much noise, mainly attributed to distortions by the media, has not proven very helpful in understanding what is happening during a controversy. This is because expertise is not only a message, but also, and mainly, a process.' Expertise cannot be reduced to the set of statements uttered by experts; it is first and foremost the result of collective learning and assessment. Indeed, we would argue that it is expertise, understood as an ongoing learning process resulting from the interactions between participants in a controversy, which in the end defines the status of expert knowledge and sets the limits of its efficacy.I0 This entails that expertise is not the property of a given individual, the expert; rather, the expert status itself is at stake in public forums and needs to be re-established at each new development of a controversy. When this fails, as often happens, expert knowledge as knowledge of experts is largely discounted and ignored or, even worse, it becomes dysfunctional, a part of the problem rather than a part of the solution.
As opposed to the focus on the attributes of experts, the focus on the procedures through which experts are mobilized and put to use has proven more fruitful. It has displaced attention from the experts as persons, to the organized ways in which expertise is implemented. In doing so, it has also drawn attention to the different ways in which the cultural peculiarities of the various national public administrations and political systems affect the performance and consequences of expertise." From a pragmatic viewpoint, and from the perspective of fostering an effective democratic participation, the critical analysis o f such procedures and structures may contribute significantly to the improvement of decision-making mechanisms. However, the almost exclusive focus of these studies on the modalities according to which governments, their agencies, as well as courts of law, have used expertise for decision-making, has resulted in a lack of attention to the display of expert knowledge in the controversist spaceper se, that is by participant groups in a public forum.
A non-reductionist view of controversies
To make sense of the quandary in which experts often find themselves. and of the meaning of expertise as a process, we have to conceive of controversies in a more complex manner than is usually done.
I. Controversies are often seen as public encounters in which there are only two sides: those in favour and those opposed to a given project. The opponents are often collectively identified as 'the public'. This is a very reductionist view. After all, one ought to notice that decisions themselves, when they do not proceed from processes such as a referendum-a largely democratic, but certainly also reductionist procedure-but result from deliberations of administrators or elected decision-makers, often show a large degree of unpredictable complexity, and, in general, differ markedly from the proposal which triggered the original controversy or consultation. These decisions are usually interpreted, or, rather, interpreted away, as the result of strategic calculations-ask more than you actually want in order to get what you want-or of compromise-give something to each of the two sides. Strategy and compromise undoubtedly happen; however the game is much more complex than that. Today's public controversies are not the equivalent of the medieval academic exercise of the disputatio, where a defendant argued against a contradictor (with the possible exception, once again, of a referendum where citizens are asked to answer by yes or no to a predefined question; such a procedure generates a debate which, at a collective level, approximates a dispurario).
2. Scientific controversies, as traditionally understood, do not provide a better model of public controversies, insofar as they are equated to exchanges among scientists centring on the task of ascertaining what ought to be accepted as truth. Public controversies do not aim at establishing truth (though their participants are not indifferent to what should count as truth-far from it); public controversies aim at decisions which may have to be taken amidst significant uncertainties, for reasons of urgency, prudence or even expediency.
opened up for public participation. Rather, the participants themselves, by engaging in a dispute and generating interchanges. progressively shape the controversy and define its (disputed) content. This is why a public controversy almost never seems well focused, and also why much of the exchanges seem at cross-purpose. And indeed they are, because a public controversy, once again, is not a disputario between two parties. It is always a highly polycentred affair. Contrary to what happens in a scientific controversy, participants in a public controversy do not all agree on the identification of the relevant issues, or on what is at stake.I2
5.
Each group engaging in a controversy-and by the term 'group' we are referring not to some pre-defined sociological category but, rather, to an empirical unit of varying size such as, for instance. the authors of a brief-has much latitude to construct in its own way both the various entities that will inhabit that controversy, and the relationships which are supposed to exist between those entities. This amounts to defining what that controversy ought to be about. I have chosen to refer to these particular collections of entities and relationships by the terms 'worlds of relevance'. Empirical analyses of transcripts, briefs, leaflets and other documents written and circulated during controversies show that there are always more than two worlds of relevance in the course of a single controversy. and sometimes many more than two. They evolve over time, and may converge or diverge.
Sketching the complexity of a controversy
To give a more precise idea of what this means, let us sketch here some of the results obtained from one of our case studies. It concerns a controversy which raged in QuPbec from around 1981 to 1985. It was triggered by a programme that the Ministry for Energy and Resources wanted to launch to fight an epidemic infestation of the forests by an insect. the spruce-budworm. The proposed programme consisted in the aerial spraying of chemical pesticides over the forest. Provided attention is really paid to what some 70 participating groups wrote and said, and provided the controversy is not reduced a priori to the too simple-minded dichotomy between those in favour and those opposed to the spraying programme, then, even a summary analysis will reveal the presence of a very broad variety of understandings of what was at stake in that controversy. What we found, in other, shorter terms, is a significant diversity of worlds of relevance unfolding in the controversist space. I3 For the government and its experts. the issue was a straightforward one: the problem was the epidemic of spruce-budworm, and the solution the aerial spraying of chemical pesticides. But many other groups disagreed. Some agreed with the identification of the epidemic as the problem, except that they did not see the use of chemical pesticides as an appropriate solution; they advocated the use of a biological pesticide, the bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis. Others, while also agreeing with the identification of the epidemic as the problem, argued that pesticides, either chemical or biologcial were not solution, and that priority should be given to the development and use of new technologies, for instance, pheromone traps, which involved a very different representation of the insect and forest environment. Yet other groups rejected the proposition that the epidemic was a problem: in their opinion it was a perfectly normal process which would disappear in due time through natural ecological cycles. The problem was the use of chemicals by the government. Others thought that the spruce-budworm, and the focus on the insect world, was a secondary issue; in their view, government and industry shared the dubious privilege of constituting the primary problem, the government because of its bad forest policies. and industry because of its mismanagement of natural resources. We were able to find even more radically different definitions of the relevant issues. Some briefs. for instance, presented no spruce-budworm, no forest management, and no forest industry, but, rather, a laboratory world of chemicals, chemical reactions, intermediate metabolites and physiological functions.
Textual analysis has allowed us to identify half a dozen markedly different configurations, corresponding to as many ways of defining the issue, the problem, the solutions, and of identifying the relevant actors, human and non-humans, and the relationships they entertained. Worlds of relevance, as this example makes clear, differ in the nature and diversity of the entities they mobilize, and in the ways they relate these entities to each other.
Such configurational diversity is not exclusive to the spruce-budworm controversy. It obtains in other cases we have analysed, namely the controversies concerning genetic engineering research and the field testing of genetically modified organisms in the USA and in Canada, irradiation of foodf4 and the fluoridation of water in M~n t r e a l . '~ Similarly, a variety of worlds of relevance can be found in another ongoing case study, dealing with the emerging controversy over the possible health risks of electromagnetic fields from powerlines. '6 Expertise as a process in the controversist space M y remarks up to this point have several consequences for the understanding of the dynamics of controversies. Only a few points will be addressed here. as they are more directly related to the public understanding of science and to the role of experts.
We understand better now why unidirectional communication-such as the one preached in the 'fill the knowledge-gap' approach-or even bilateral communicationthe 'listen to your audience to communicate more effectively' approach-would prove inefficient here. There are not just two sides. Moreover, the experts are not always on the same 'side', and they are not confronted with what used to be called 'audiences'. Indeed, the traditional expert-centred understanding of the dynamics of controversies is misleading. Participating groups are fully-fledged uc/ors in the controversist space, as much as the originator of the proposal that has triggered the controversy, or the institutional decision makers. Corresponding neither to 'audiences' nor to a public waiting to be 'educated'. all the actors involved in controversies contribute to the dynamic unfolding of their content. We ought to apply here the sociologists of science's 'principle of symmetry', in a new guise: equality of analytic treatment is called for not just in regard to two parties. but in regard to all the worlds of relevance represented in and constitutive of a controversy.
Controversies are never settled by a mechanism whereby participants would listen to and accept the viewpoint of experts. This is not only because in most-probably all-controversies, expertise is plural and contradictory; but also, and mainly, because what is at issue during a controversy is the negotiation of the associations which should be established between the various worlds of relevance mobilized by different participants. Such associations are not a priori defined; rather, they are the emergent outcome of the participants' activities. Experts certainly provide data and information, content ofthe learning should be'.I9 but these elements have to be assessed and eventually used by other actors to have any effectiveness. This is why expertise truly is a collective learning process. This point has already been made in an insightful manner by Arie Rip, who underlined how agonistic relations 'provide the opportunity for social learning that can lead to robust outcomes'." Through the controversist process, arguments can be mutually articulated." The term 'arguments' could be misleading. It does not refer to different interpretations of a substantially shared natural and social world. The process of association proceeds from sometimes radically distinct representations provided by various actors, as they compare the entities that the different worlds they resort to may lack or share, and weight the significance of the relationships established by other actors between these entities. Again, the actors are not an audience, nor are they 'students' to be taught: 'the learning is open ended, and there is no "teacher" to set standards and design a learning process. This is no idealist representation of how actors ought to act in controversies; it is a description of how they do behave in such processes. It is not predicated upon the notion of rational actors without passions and interests; on the contrary, it takes for granted the diversity of motives of these actors, as well as their strategizing. However, these motives and strategies are emergent elements of the controversist process. If this is granted, one can then assume that they account for the way in which opportunities for articulation are seized upon, as well as for the establishment of linkages between different worlds of relevance, and, as a consequence, for the definition of approaches which might eventually be seen as constraining by the decision makers (which is not the same thing as reaching consensus).
Empirical analyses show that worlds of relevance are not to be equated with discrete, incommensurable social and/or cognitive worlds."' Communication is passible and occurs. As Brian Wynne has concluded from some of his studies 'laypeople [are] capable of extensive informal reflection upon their social relationships towards scientific experts, and on the epistemological status of their own "local" knowledge to "'outside" knowledge'.*' Indeed, the examination of statements by the same actors at different times during a controversy reveals the existence of numerous interactions, borrowings and translations of entities and relationships from other worlds of relevance. These 'compromises' between worlds entail a reduction in the number of isolated worlds. It thus comes as no surprise to us that the text of decisions which have provided a robust closure to a controversy often exhibit a careful association of many entities from the different worlds of relevance deployed during the controversyz2
The outcome of a controversy is largely unpredictable, because it depends on the ongoing interaction between the actors, and, more particularly, on the success or failure of their attempts to articulate various worlds of relevance. While a drift towards increased fragmentation is an unlikely event, the controversist process, when left to itself, may be slow in generating associations, especially if the various actors do not engage in open confrontation and thus remain mutually invisible. Given that decision making is the horizon of a public controversy, this may prove to be a major problem. Decisions cannot be indefinitely postponed. Political life functions according to a relatively short-term agenda, and participants who often got involved out of a sense of urgency want decisions to be taken quickly. This means that unless something is done to quicken the pace of social learning, namely by openly confronting actors and worlds of relevance, the conditions for strong associations and for robust decisions will not be met. In the absence of sufficient associations, decisions will either not be taken, thus increasing turmoil and frustrations, or they w,ill be taken on a shaky ground, without adequate support, and remain fragile, a situation likely to generate new and more acrimonious debates.
Controversies, then, need to be 'managed', a notion that meets resistance for two, quite opposite, sets of reasons. First, there are many people who resent what they consider to be messy and chaotic social eruptions; they think of controversies as deplorable accidents, or symptoms of failure. Understandably, they resist the idea of institutionalizing ways to manage what they think should be eradicated Competent administration, they believe, should preclude controversies, so it would be counterproductive to empower institutions for the management, not to say the encouragement, of controversies. Though understandable, this position is mistaken, both for factual reasons-public controversies are multiplying, they will not be contained and they cannot be ignored-and also for normative reasons-controversies are, however messy they may look, exercises in democracy, and, properly managed, they can become fruitful learning processes.
Reluctance to accept the notion of controversy management also comes from a second group. for totally different reasons. Criticism, in this case, focuses on the risk of manipulation of 'citizen groups' by the controversy managers. No doubt some risk of manipulation will always be present, but, for that matter, not just on the side of the controversy managers; moreover, it will exist even in the absence of any dedicated management contrivance. The central issue, however, is that the goal of controversy management is not social engineering, i.e., some sort of technocratic piloting towards a pre-determined outcome. Management is meant here to fulfil the function of facilitating the work of association by the actors themselves, by creating circumstances for discursive interchanges and by providing occasions for actual interactions.
Neither is it the role of controversy managers to keep discussions 'in focus', since, given the plurality of worlds of relevance, what the focus ought to be is one of the main stakes of a controversy. It is, rather, to act as brokers, to clarify and implement rules to facilitate processes of negotiation about what should be considered the relevant issues and about the possible establishment of bridges between the different worlds of relevance. In brief, controversy management is a matter of networking, of smoothing the way for associations between previously isolated worlds.
This brokerage is best done by mechanisms at arm's length from all parties concerned, including the government itself." It is this distance which allows for the testing of statements involving different worlds, for the use of counter-expertise in a less loaded context and with higher credibility, and for the emergence and validationwith the participating groups-of a robust outcome of the controversy. This active brokerage also helps to maintain the required reflexivity, to prevent at any given moment the polarization of the controversy and to avoid any retreat into the insularity of different worlds of relevance.
When decisions are finally made, their robustness is a function of their ability to reflect both the density of associations generated during the controversy, and the networking resulting from the articulation of diverse worlds of relevance. Such decisions never express a consensus, but, rather, a more or less extensive association of worlds of relevance. In the case of the spruce-budworm controversy, for instance, the 1985 decision by the Qukbec government which put an end to the controversy exemplified how robust decision making is predicated on the previous associations generated through the interaction of actors. The government decree incorporated more than 30 of the entities displayed in various worlds of relevance, many of which were absent from the initial framing of the issue, and reflected the major associations which had emerged between these entities during the controversy.
The robustness of decisions is thus predicated upon their ability to reflect associations. and upon the extension and heterogeneity of the network created through these associations. It is, of course, always possible that a given controversy, even when properly managed, may lead to a polarized situation, with two non-associable networks confronting each other. Even in this case, however. the two networks may differ considerably both in size and strength, a situation which will then not preclude a robust decisionF4
Conclusion
Expertise as a social learning process is a matter of articulating worlds of relevance, through analysis and assessment in the course of interchanges. It is a matter of associations, of networking. The availability of controversy managers, playing the role of brokers. is a way of promoting these processes. This is so because these institutionally defined actors create the conditions for the deployment of an interaction among different worlds of relevance. They may also translate, make more explicit and by so doing put to the test the associations which have emerged in the course of a controversy. In that role they prepare the ground for decision making. In a controversy context, actors from these managing/brokering institutions become, so to speak, procedural experts whose role is to forward substantial expertise as a collective process. Their effectiveness is as great as the credibility of the organization they pertain to: it is largely not a personal attribute.
As for the experts in the more traditional sense, they have become the object of a double paradox. We believe less and less in experts, and yet we use them more and more. Experts are at their weakest when a controversy rages and their contribution would seem most needed: and yet, when the controversy is over and decisions have been made, experts become very powerful and their statements are no longer contested. This apparent mystery is solved when one realizes that the credibility of expertise does not come from individual attributes, but from the strength of the networks with which the experts are associated, that is from the articulations emerging from the controversy, which eventually will provide a basis for decision making. So, it is no paradox to conclude that it is expertise as a collective learning process which provides experts with their much needed credibility. In the end, the relationship between the public and the experts is the reverse of what it is generally assumed to be: it is not the expert who educates the public, it is expertise as a public process which creates the conditions of credibility for expert performance.
